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The narrative sense of others
Shaun Gallagher, University of Memphis

Comment on Duranti, Alessandro. 2015. The anthropology of
intentions: Language in a world of others. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.

Philosophers often point to the role of narrative in supporting judgments of agency
and evaluative judgments of responsibility in cases of individual action and intention formation. Very few of them, however, suggest that narrative can play a similar role in collaborative decision-making and joint or collective action (Gallagher
and Tollefsen 2017). Rather, philosophical accounts of collective agency and intentionality start by looking inside the heads of the individual participants/group
members. Thus, for example, Raimo Tuomela (1984: 17) identifies his view of collective intentionality as individualistic and based on the “principle of conceptual
individualism,” where holistic social concepts are reduced to individualist ones.
Likewise, John Searle (1990: 407) writes: “collective intentionality, and therefore. . .
collective behavior, must be consistent with our overall ontology [. . . which is]
based on the existence of indivdual human beings as the repositories of all intentionality, whether individual or collective. . . . We are not required to suppose that
there is any element in society other than individuals” (see Duranti 2015: 213–14).
What Searle calls a “we intention” is not the summation of I- or individual intentions; rather, it’s just a special kind of individual intention, e.g., my intention to do
something together with you.
This is the classic view, as characterized by Hans Bernhard Schmid (2014: 10):
“Groups exist in virtue of the participants’ [individual] beliefs that the groups exist.” On this view, as Schmid suggests: “there is an air of mystery about the idea of
a collective subject [or ‘we’]” (2014: 11). This motivates the question of whether
anything in joint action or collaboration goes beyond just individual mental states,
or additive aspects of the individual agents.
 his work is licensed under the Creative Commons | © Shaun Gallagher.
T
ISSN 2049-1115 (Online). DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.14318/hau7.2.039

Shaun Gallagher

468

One strategy is to base the “we” or collective sense of intention on a shared
sense of joint agency as Pacherie (2014) suggests. But Pacherie also argues that the
sense (experience) of joint agency is to be found in the individual, not at a superindividual level of group mind. In this case, I have a sense that we are working
together; you have a sense that we are working together; so we have a sense that we
are working together. The overall ontology is still limited to a plurality of individual
minds. If, however, we look closer, I think we can see something that goes beyond
conceptual individualism.
Pacherie (2014) agrees that an individual’s sense of agency is based on a complex of multiple factors that involve intention formation (see Gallagher 2012a).
Let’s consider her threefold distinction between different kinds of intentions.
•
•
•

 otor, or M-intentions, are specified in motor-control detail as I move toward
M
a goal
Proximate, or P-intentions, are specified in environment-related perceptual
predictions and feedback for the immediate guidance of ongoing action
Distal, or D-intentions, are prior intentions specified in a reflective (prospective) process of deliberation and intention formation

Here is an example, in the plural. My wife and I engage in a conversation where
we deliberate and decide to buy a new car next week (this is the formation of a
D-intention). Next week arrives and we head out to the auto dealer, we walk around
kicking some tires, and then sit down and sign a contract, etc. Our actions can
be described in term of fulfilling P-intentions (transporting ourselves to the auto
dealer, kicking the tires). All of this movement we are engaged in is specified in its
details by M-intentions (extending a leg to kick; using a hand to sign). One can add
retrospective evaluation which may reinforce our respective senses of agency for
what we did.
Do any of these factors contribute to something more than an individual sense
of joint agency? I think it depends on the type of joint action at stake. Consider
three different types of joint action.
•
•

•

 d hoc emergent joint action, e.g., we’re standing close by, the music starts
A
and I grab you and start dancing. This kind of joint action depends on low-level
motoric/perceptual processes involving M- and P-intentions.
Planned joint action to accomplish some short-term goal, here and now: for
example, we consider the position of a table and then move it to the next room.
There are P- and M-intentions involved, and perhaps a relatively undeveloped
D-intention.
Planned coordinated project: this involves longer-term, distributed processes
that require the formation of detailed D-intentions, prospective planning, and
ongoing retrospective review to keep track of complex, articulated actions.

There are two ways that a sense of agency may involve something more than just
individual experiences or mental states. In the first case, if our dancing involves
synchronous movements, our interactions may form at the level of basic M-intentions, what Soliman and Glenberg (2014) have called a “joint body schema.” In their
study, two participants coordinate for five minutes by moving a flexible wire back
and forth to cut through a candle. This requires close synchronous coordination.
2017 | Hau: Journal of Ethnographic Theory 7 (2): 467–473
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Soliman and Glenberg show that, just as in the case of tool use where both neuroscientific and behavioral measures show that one’s peripersonal space extends
to the end of the tool (Maravita and Iriki 2004), one’s peripersonal space extends
to include the other person as one is engaged in such interaction. There are two
interpretations of these results. (1) A process in the individual involving one’s body
schema/peripersonal space expands; and the other person’s body schema does so
too. These are subpersonal changes that may generate or modulate an individual
sense of joint agency—a feeling of being in sync with the other. (2) Two bodies acting together form a larger action system, so the joint body schema belongs only to
this larger system (two parts constituting a larger whole). Like the tango, the phenomenon emerges only in a process that goes beyond the individual actors. Clearly,
this phenomenon, operating at the level of M-intentions, is limited to synchronous
interaction—not all joint action involves this type of interaction.
What about the level of P-intentions? Is there anything that might count as
more than an individual factor. Searle (1983) indicates that P-intentions, which
may specify a common goal, do not specify the means in the same way and are
agent individuating—they cannot be the same for you and me, precisely because
two embodied agents are not embedded in the environment in the same way. Accordingly, action specifications at the level of P-intention will not be shared. For the
purposes of this short comment, let’s accept this view. I think the more interesting
process happens on the level of the D-intention.
In regard to planning out a long-term project or short-term joint action,
prospective deliberation or reflective thinking (e.g., in the context of forming
D-intentions or planning out how to do things) can be a social process, as in the
case of my wife and I deliberating about buying a new car. We can reflect together
via communicative actions, about what we want to do, or about how we should go
about doing it. What my initial individual intention might have been can change
through this communicative process into an intention that is not reducible to
just my or your individual intention. There’s no problem here of speaking about a
collectively formed intention. But we can ask, “where” does a collectively formed
intention reside? In our individual minds? Or in what can be called a socially
extended mind, or institution (Gallagher 2013), or what Alessandro Duranti
(2015) calls a socially distributed cognition (Duranti 2015: 219). Such institutions
go beyond individual cognitive processes or habits: they include communicative practices, and more established institutions include rituals and traditions
that generate actions, preserve memories, solve problems. These are distributed
processes supported by artifacts, tools, technologies, environments, institutional
structures, etc.
And narrative. Narrative plays an important role here, since it is rare that joint
actions are conducted on the basis of lists or instructions. It is possible that we
could follow a set of instructions, but typically we would want to know why we
are doing so, or at least where our actions are leading. Narratives address the why
question as well as the how question. Clearly, our retrospective evaluations of our
actions take the form of narrative; so do our prospective deliberations. What are we
going to do, and why are we doing it?
There are developed discussions of the use of narratives in the case of individual
deliberation, intention formation, and retrospective attribution and evaluation of
2017 | Hau: Journal of Ethnographic Theory 7 (2): 467–473
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actions. Graham and Stephens (1994), for example, suggest the individual sense of
agency originates in retrospective attribution—understanding this in terms of “our
proclivity for constructing self-referential narratives,” which allow us to explain
our behavior retrospectively, which reinforces our sense of agency (1994: 101).
David Velleman (2007) suggests that narrative acts as a framework for testing one’s
D-intention formation, a concept he calls “narrative authorship.” On this view, narrative is a means of self-governing (supporting individual autonomy). In the individual this involves reflective (or narrative) distance, and it allows for what Charles
Taylor (1989) calls strong evaluation.
Narratives are social products. They emerge relatively early in development
and in circumstances involving child’s play they lead to we-narratives (Nelson
2003). Narratives also assist in helping us understand others (Gallagher and
Hutto 2008); and they exist not only in vocalizations, but in media that go beyond individuals—in texts and documents, etc. Duranti is quite explicit about
various elements of distributed cognition, and he rightly indicates: “in coordinating our actions with others, as, for example, when we are engaged in a joint
activity, we do not have to hold everything in our mind in order to execute a given task or engage in a given activity” (Duranti 2015: 220). Distributed cognition
means the distribution of knowledge throughout environments—instructions,
instruments, other people, etc., Gibsonian affordances; Goodwin’s semiotic resources; Searle’s “Background”; Bourdieu’s habitus. Yes to all of this, but I want
to add, narratives too.
Throughout The anthropology of intentions, Duranti makes extensive and excellent use of narratives as an evidence source about various practices in different cultures, including his analysis of jazz improvisation (e.g., p. 226); yet, in his
considerations of intentionality and intersubjectivity, he doesn’t mention the way
narrative can work as part of distributed cognition, or in contexts of collective intentionality and group agency. It may be that he simply assumes this, but I think it
is worth explicating. In this respect his analysis can be extended with the addition
of narrative.
Specifically it is possible to show that narrative practices can lead to a collective sense of joint agency (in ways that go beyond simply the sharing of individual
mental events); they can help to shape group identity; they can solve problems
of stability of intentions and projects across time; they can provide resources for
problem solving; and provide ways to track progress toward a goal. A focus on narratives could also flesh out Duranti’s critique of Searle, even as it could help to explain concepts like “Background” and habitus. Rather than rehearsing these issues
(see Gallagher and Tollefsen 2017; Tollefsen and Gallagher 2017 for discussion), let
me focus on one issue that is of significant concern to Duranti.
Collective or shared intentionality can lead to the formation of in-group/outgroup opposition. An “increase of sociality toward some members turns out to be a
reduction of sociality toward other” (219). This is the “dark side” (231) of such social phenomena. “Being able to empathize, exchange places, and understand each
other also feed social conformity, lack of authenticity, the acceptance of the locally
sanctioned prestige—what Gramsci … called ‘hegemony’—and ultimately, the reproduction of the status quo” (231). Duranti points to discussions of these issues
2017 | Hau: Journal of Ethnographic Theory 7 (2): 467–473
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in classic phenomenology; he could well point to ongoing debates (e.g., Gallagher
2012b, 2014; Maibom 2014; Prinz 2011). These same issues are reflected in considerations about narrative.
In contexts of institutional evaluation or action justification, one might challenge the idea that narrative is the right thing to be looking at since a group’s narrative may be nothing more than PR, a smoke screen, or propaganda—deceptive
and not reflective of the real identity of the group. There is a deeper issue: to the
extent that the instituted narrative, even if formed over time by many individuals,
transcends those individuals and may persist beyond them, it may loop around
to constrain or dominate the group members or the group as a whole. Collective
(institutional, corporate) narratives often take on a life (an autonomy) of their own
and may come to oppose or undermine the intentions of the individual members.
Narrative practices in both extended institutional and collective structures and
practices can be positive in allowing us to see certain possibilities, but at the same
time, they can carry our cognitive processes and social interactions in specific directions and blind us to other possibilities.
Structures supported by narratives can play a dominating role in bureaucratic
systems, democratic processes, and in an extensive range of social, legal, and political practices. Narratives, in supporting the formation of institutions, traditions,
practices, etc., can be rigid protectors of the status quo, promoters of corporate and
nationalist interests, and hinder innovative thinking. For this reason some critical
theorists (e.g., Habermas 1987) are suspicious of narrative.
Given its conservative nature, the question is whether narrative can be critical
in the sense of providing reflective resources to generate new or different possibilities. Can narratives be both keepers of memory, and also represent the blueprints
of change?
Indeed, it is not clear how one could generate new or different possibilities
without employing narrative. From a critical perspective, we may need to look
for hidden narratives; we may have to struggle to tell an alternative story. In doing so, we may want to give more weight to what Striblen (2013) calls externally
constructed narratives, i.e., narratives by people outside of the group or institution
from a perspective that can allow for more distance from a group’s own narrated
actions.
A critical use of narrative, then, would allow for attaining a critical distance
essential to effecting a strong evaluation. Narrative allows for the possibility of
taking a critical look at how social and cultural practices either productively extend or, in some cases, curtail collective processes and shape our intersubjective
relations.
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